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Credit PartiCiPation and 
Credit SourCe SeleCtion of 
Vietnam Small and medium 
enterPriSeS
This study is an attempt to investigate the motivation behind the decision to participate in the 
credit market of SMEs from perspectives of behavioral finance and social capital theories. In addi-
tion, the study also examines the effect of behavioral finance and social capital factors on the credit 
source selection among SMEs. This study’s design strategy involves conducting questionnaire sur-
veys to SMEs owners and statistical techniques to analyze the determinants of credit participation 
and credit source selection of borrowers. The findings showed that personal traits of SMEs owners/
managers in terms of behavioral finance factors such as debt and risk attitudes, present biased and 
overconfidence and firms networking also have impacts on the firms’ credit participation and credit 
source selection. The research is one of the few studies that consider the influence of behavioral 
finance factors on firms financing decision. Furthermore, our result also contributes to explain the 
common use of informal credit market in developing countries.
Keywords: behavioral finance, credit participation, credit source selection, formal 
credit, informal credit.
Abstract
most Smes in the world face challenge in finding financ-ing resources. multiple 
studies in developed countries indi-
cated that Smes are high-risk borrow-
ers (nguyen et al., 2006; Sogorb-mira, 
2005) and providing the financial re-
sources for Smes is considered a great 
obstacle compared with large firms. 
Smes in emerging economies suffer 
more hindrances in finance access be-
cause of the underdevelopment of fi-
nancial institutions and infrastructure, 
poor property rights protection and 
serious information asymmetry issues. 
SME’s debt financing is a classic theme 
gaining attention by numerous schol-
ars. Whereas many empirical studies 
of SME financing decision have as-
sumed implicitly that the ultimate goal 
of SMEs is to maximize profits, other 
researchers have argued that the goal 
of independence and control is much 
preferred by Sme owners. With the 
objective of profit maximization, there 
is a common sense that Smes also pur-
sue growth and inquire about external 
finance sources (Sogorb-Mira, 2005). 
With this assumption, traditional theo-
ries of capital structure such as trade-
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ant may initiate more merger and ac-
quisition projects and, therefore, may 
pursue heightened leverage policies 
(Grable and lytton, 2003). especially, 
many studies on consumer borrowing 
and microfinance investigated the im-
pact of behavioral finance factors such 
as present-biased preference or impa-
tience, risk-attitude and debt-attitude 
on borrowing decisions of individu-
als (Bauer et al., 2012; laibson et al., 
2007; Brown et al., 2013).
Consumer finance and corporate fi-
nance are different fields but in the 
case of studying SME finance, we can 
‘borrow’ the ideas and results from the 
studies on consumer finance to apply 
to the explanation of SME debt financ-
ing decisions. this is because the Sme 
sector has some unique characteristics. 
first, it is extremely complicated to 
differentiate the financial situation of 
the firm from that of its owners. For 
instance, the entrepreneur can use the 
firm cars and home accommodations 
for both private and business purpos-
es. furthermore, different from large 
firms, the decision-making process, 
financing decision included, is mostly 
in the hands of Sme owners or manag-
ers. With large enterprises, especially 
with joint-stock listed companies, 
the decision-making process is much 
more complicated and is often affected 
or ruled over by other members in the 
company’s board of directors. in other 
words, business and financing deci-
sion with Smes is often personally 
managed. therefore, Sme owners’ 
knowledge, psychology and attitudes 
can have an effect on the company’s 
financing decision. Second, the rela-
tionships between the small firm and 
its stakeholders tend to reflect the 
owner’s personal relationships much 
off theory and pecking order theory 
can help to explain some parts of Sme 
financing decisions. However, the tra-
ditional approaches could not help to 
explain the circumstance of ‘debt-ad-
verse’ among Smes. in other words, 
these theories could not explain why 
many Smes do not participate in the 
credit market even though they have 
a demand of growth and borrowing. 
discouraged borrowers are often ig-
nored from these traditional theories. 
on the other hand, a small number 
of researchers investigated the rela-
tionship between non-financial mo-
tivations and corporate financing 
decisions. Several theories and as-
sumptions were proposed to explain 
the debt aversion or borrowing dis-
courage phenomenon among business, 
especially the Sme sector (Cressy, 
1995; rice and Strahan, 2010). one 
of these theories is the theory of social 
capital or firm networks. According to 
this theory, networks could give Smes 
an advantage in order to access a bank 
loan by increasing the firms’ legitima-
cy (le and nguyen, 2009; nguyen and 
ramachandran, 2006; ravina, 2012; 
moro and fink 2013) or help Smes 
find other sources of funding easily by 
reducing the need for bank loans (Hus-
sain et al., 2006). 
in addition, the evolution of behavior 
finance theories is suggestive of the 
studies on determinants of consumer 
borrowing and corporate borrowing 
decisions. for instance, behavioral 
corporate finance literature suggested 
that optimism and overconfidence can 
considerably affect the investment and 
financing decisions made by managers 
(Baker et al., 2005; fairchild, 2005); 
or managers that are more risk toler-
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75% Smes would like to access bank 
loans but only about 30% of them suc-
ceeded (VCCi, 2010). another survey 
conducted by the Central institutions 
of economic management (Ciem), 
only 30% of Smes were able to ob-
tain bank loans. the Ciem report in 
2012 also confirmed that “constraints 
in credit markets have for a long time 
been cited (by firms) as the most se-
rious obstacles for future growth of 
Smes in Vietnam” (Ciem, 2012).
Smes mainly contact commercial 
banks to obtain necessary funds. ad-
ditionally, twice as many firms obtain 
informal loans as compared to formal 
ones. although informal loans only 
finance 8 to 9 percent of total invest-
ments for Smes, almost 90% of the 
constrained group (in formal credit 
markets) has access to loans from in-
formal sources. this shows that infor-
mal loans are small but a frequent part 
of the Vietnamese SMEs financing 
scheme. in addition, the Ciem survey 
also revealed that more than 57% of 
Smes do not want to go into debt in 
the future, especially getting loan from 
banks. 
this study proposes a new approach to 
investigate the latent factors affecting 
the credit participation among Smes 
with respect to behavioral finance and 
social capital theories. in addition, 
the study also examines the effect of 
behavioral finance and social capital 
factors on the credit source selection 
among Smes. through new approach-
es on SMEs debt financing, the study 
aims to answer the questions: Why do 
many Smes not want to participate in 
the credit market? and what motivates 
Smes to select informal credit sources 
to finance their operations?
more than in larger firms where such 
relationships are formalized. it is ex-
pected that large firms carry out stand-
ard corporate governance practices 
that executives, board of directors and 
auditors are assumed to conform to 
transparent norms. third, the interrela-
tionship between SMEs and financial 
institutions is looser in comparison 
with large firms. In other words, SME 
owners often have strong ties with 
informal strands, which leads to the 
choice of informal credit sources. this 
particular feature of Sme network or 
social capital obviously has an effect 
on their credit participation. 
Vietnam signifies an exciting case. 
in fact, the country ranks 40th out 
of 183 countries in terms of getting 
credit in 2012 (World Bank, 2012). 
this is a relatively good outcome 
of the banking system. Commercial 
banks, including state-owned com-
mercial banks (SoCBs) and private 
banks, compete with each other to in-
crease the credit market share and are 
beginning to recognize the Sme sec-
tor as a prospective market and sketch 
out strategies to approach this sector. 
However, capital shortage is still a big 
hindrance to the Sme community. the 
large majority of Smes in Vietnam are 
very small indeed, and are largely de-
pendent  on  purely  internal  and/or 
informal  sources  of  financing. This 
is true in many developing and tran-
sitional economies. as the more suc-
cessful Smes grow, they are likely to 
need – and get improved access to – 
more formal and external sources of 
financing.
in Vietnam, according to a recent re-
search executed by Vietnam Chamber 
of Commerce and industry (VCCi), 
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could fully explain the motivations 
behind credit participation of the 
firms, especially in respect of “debt-
averse” firms. Nonetheless, behavio-
ral finance theories and social capital 
theory strongly argue that the degree 
of present-biased preference, risk atti-
tude, debt attitude, overconfidence of 
business managers and social capital 
can significantly influence their debt/
equity selection. Hence, as this study 
proposes, these factors should be con-
sidered as the potential determinant of 
credit participation decision by Smes.
Present Biased Preference or 
Hyperbolic Discounting
there is an assumption among econo-
mists that people are “time-consistent”, 
meaning that “a person’s relative pref-
erence for well-being at an earlier date 
over a later date is the same no matter 
when she is asked” (o’donoghue and 
Rabin, 2000). However, people are 
not always patient, conversely, they 
often prefer to enjoy rewards soon 
but suspend costs until later (Kinari 
et al., 2009). Such inclining is called 
present-biased preferences. the de-
gree of time discounting is critical in 
making finance decisions such as sav-
ing, borrowing and investment deci-
sions. regarding the association be-
the study makes the distinction be-
tween credit participation and credit 
source selection. these terms con-
tribute to a fully-constituted process 
of the debt financing decision (Figure 
1). When making decisions regarding 
the firm’s capital structure, at the first 
stage, the Sme owner has to decide 
whether or not to use debt in the firm 
capital structure (credit participation). 
then, if the owner decides to go with 
debt or participate in the credit mar-
kets, he or she must select the credit 
source (or the credit pattern), mean-
ing that they will go with formal credit 
sources, semi-formal credit programs 
or informal credit sources (credit 
source selection).
the remainder of the paper is organ-
ized into three sections: the next sec-
tion we provide a review of behavioral 
finance factors as well as social capital 
theory and their impact on borrowing 
issues. the following section describes 
the research methodology of the study. 
findings and discussion are presented 
in the fourth section. finally, section 
five concludes with a summary. 
Literature review
none of traditional capital structure 
theories and empirical researches 
figure 1. debt financing decision flow Chart
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or investment opportunities from the 
future to the present, where their value 
is considered higher than in the future, 
according to the time preference per-
spective. therefore, in this study, we 
expect credit participation and credit 
choice of SMEs will be influenced by 
the owners’ time preference. 
Risk Aversion
there is a considerable difference 
among individuals about how they 
deal with risks and incertitude. Some 
studies showed that attitude toward 
risk was accompanied with individu-
ally imperative decisions and features 
(dohmen et al., 2005; Brown et al., 
2013). Debt financing is always asso-
ciated with risks such as risks of bank-
ruptcy, risk of losing collateral, risk of 
fluctuating interest rate. Therefore, at-
titude toward risk is expected to have 
an impact on debt holdings of individu-
als. fore example, Brown et al. (2013) 
in their empirical study explored that 
risk aversion and household debt in 
the u.S varied in opposing directions, 
meaning that people with higher level 
of risk aversion have a tendency to em-
ploy less debt. daly et al. (2010) also 
used “Risk attitudes as an independ-
ent predictor of debt”. they concluded 
that “Risk willingness is a robust pre-
dictor of debt holdings even control-
ling for demographics, personality, 
consideration of future consequences 
and other covariate”. Hence, in our 
study, the risk attitude is expected to 
have effect on credit choice and credit 
participation of Smes. 
Debt Attitudes
In the financial psychology literature, 
attitude toward debt or debt aversion is 
concerned as one of the determinants 
tween present-biased preference and 
credit behaviors, based on experimen-
tal evidences, several studies indicated 
that individuals with higher level of 
present-biased time preferences have 
propensities to use more debts (meier 
and Sprenger, 2007; laibson, 2007). 
the massive and increasingly use of 
credit card debt has been recently ex-
plained by present-biased preference 
literature. meier and Sprenger (2007) 
explain that since credit cards can of-
fer an instant borrowing, they enable 
present-biased individuals the oppor-
tunity to “easily and instantaneously 
move consumption from the future, 
where its value is relatively low, to 
the present, where its value is dispro-
portionately high”. recently, ikeda 
and myong (2011) conducted a na-
tionwide internet survey of Japanese 
adults to examine how debt behavior 
is related to personal time discount-
ing. they came to an conclusion that 
“impatience are associated with high 
debt-to-income ratios, borrowing on 
credit cards, and the experiences of 
having borrowed unsecured consumer 
loans, of having engaged in debt-re-
structuring”. Besides, present-biased 
preference has been also considered as 
an commitment device to interpret the 
success of microcredit programs and 
informal rotating savings and credit 
associations in developing countries 
(Bauer et al., 2012)
for small business owners, in such a 
similar way as credit card using of con-
sumers, they can easily get loans from 
a line of credit or a business revolving 
account offered by banks or instanta-
neously obtain debts from moneylend-
ers who do not have strict requirement 
of collaterals and complicated applica-
tion process. they can move business 
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make light of the expected bankrupt-
cy cost and use more debt to receive 
benefits from tax shield (Hackbarth, 
2008). Second, overconfident manag-
ers often overvalue the upcoming pro-
jects, thus prefer to employ debt rather 
than issue new equity in order to avoid 
sharing the profits of the projects (Yu 
et al., 2006).
according to na dai (2010), overcon-
fidence could have a critical influence 
on financing decisions of small busi-
nesses much more than on big compa-
nies because “mechanisms that might 
constrain less-than-fully-rational man-
agers of a big corporation into making 
rational decisions might not be avail-
able in small firms”. For instance, big 
corporations are often committed to 
sound corporate governance systems 
such as boards of directors with in-
dependence and separation of duties, 
proxy fights, and transparent compen-
sation; meanwhile small enterprises 
almost do not have such monitoring 
mechanisms. therefore, measuring 
overconfident bias and putting it as 
expected variable in our model to pre-
dict the credit participation and credit 
source selection of Vietnam Smes is 
necessary.  
Social capital
the literature on social capital sug-
gested that borrowers, especially small 
businesses who hardly meet the lend-
ers’ requirement of collaterals and 
have poor information record, could 
resort to use social capital to improve 
their credit accessibility. Social capital 
factors also help to explain the wide-
spread existence of informal finance 
in developing countries like Vietnam. 
first, because there is no legal contract 
enforcement mechanisms in informal 
of credit behaviors. for instance, liv-
ingstone and lunt (1992) argued that 
the debt attitude was strongly associ-
ated with the extent of debt that peo-
ple carry. lea et al. (1995) reported 
that personally psychological attitude 
affect credit use, money management 
and economic socialization. davies 
and lea (1995), in their empirical 
studies on student debts, explored that 
“Students were found to be a relatively 
low-income, high-debt group with rel-
atively tolerant attitudes toward debt”. 
Consequently, previously empirical 
studies suggested that debt attitudes 
could be used as a potential factor in-
fluencing the credit participation of 
Smes. 
Overconfidence
In corporate behavioral finance litera-
ture, among cognitive biases which 
are predicted to influence financing 
and management decisions, overcon-
fidence appears to be the most highly 
cited factor determining financing 
decisions of the company. Overconfi-
dence generally denotes an exagger-
atedly optimistic estimation of one’s 
capability over a circumstance. it is 
widely believed that entrepreneurs are 
susceptibly overconfident (Hackbarth 
2008). With respect to the relationship 
between overconfidence and compa-
ny debt/equity selection, a numerous 
studies have come to a similar conclu-
sion that managerial overconfidence 
will lead to the higher use of leverage 
(Hackbarth, 2008; oliver, 2005; na 
Dai, 2010; Yu et al., 2006). There are 
some reasons contributing to the over-
confidence-high debt use correlation. 
first, the over-optimistic manager of-
ten underestimates the probability of 
the company going through financial 
distress in the future. therefore, he will 
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ers asserted that networks enable to 
improve a firms’ legitimacy and then 
enhance the access to external finance 
(le and nguyen, 2009; talavera et al., 
2012). Concretely, as found in a num-
ber of previous researches, network-
ing with government officials assists 
procedures with authorities and banks 
smoothly and quickly. Influential net-
works with government officials might 
have a substantial influence on the en-
terprise performance and help increase 
the creditworthiness when working 
with banks (Peng and luo, 2000). 
Similarly, good relationships with 
managers at other companies might 
improve the inter-firm loans accessi-
bility, trade credit and help to ease the 
business contract writing procedures. 
Well-established relationships with 
bank loan officers increase the firm 
opportunities to access bank loans and 
good relationships with informal lend-
ers may enhance the likelihood to get 
loans from informal financial institu-
tions (duy, 2012). further researches 
on the role of networking on the ac-
cess to debt finance by SMEs can be 
found in the researches by Zhang et al. 
(2006), Biggs and Sha (2006), atieno 
(2009), turvey and Kong (2010) and 
Khwaja et al. (2011). in sum, the au-
thors found a significant positive as-
sociation between networking and ac-
cess to debt.
Correspondingly, we delineated five 
groups of business cooperation: (a) 
network with business communities, 
(b) network with governmental insti-
tutes, (c) network with formal loan 
officers, (d) network with informal 
lenders, and (e) network with credit 
information bureaus. though the two 
last networks have not been supported 
strongly by previous researches, we 
credit market, informal financial in-
stitutions have no choice but depend 
more on the quantity and quality of 
their social connections than formal 
providers. Hence, social capital ca-
pacitates access to concealed infor-
mation unavailable to credit markets, 
supervise members’ behavior and pe-
nalize individual members who stand 
against the social standards or rules 
(Boot 2000). Second, Southeast asian 
developing countries hold a collectiv-
ist instead of an individualist culture 
(mcGrath et al. 1992). Consequently, 
individuals are basically social or rela-
tional beings than they are in Western 
society. this characteristic of the cul-
ture is also included in business con-
texts, meaning that managers always 
make effort to “invest” in building and 
maintaining business relationship to 
get success in business transactions, 
credit transactions included. Biggs and 
Shah (2006) argued that the operating 
environments in developing countries 
are plagued by corruption, lack of 
human and material resources, poor 
management, and inefficient judicial 
systems. as a result, entrepreneurs 
must lean on social capital and incor-
porate themselves in multi-level social 
networks.
in discussions of the relationship be-
tween social capital and credit access, 
scholars often considered and meas-
ured networks between a firm and its 
stakeholders to concretize its social 
capital (le and nguyen, 2009). in this 
research, as suggested in the previous 
literature we conceive social capital 
as the intangible assets intrinsic in 
business networks which may con-
sist of directors at other enterprises, 
bank officers, and government offi-
cials (Peng and luo, 2000). research-
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perceptions and attitude on credit in-
formation sharing activities, especially 
in developing countries. although net-
work with credit information bureaus 
is not a direct relationship, it may be 
a hidden variable affecting the credit 
accessibility and credit source choice 
of the Sme community. instead of 
measuring direct network with credit 
bureaus, in our study, we will measure 
the Sme perceptions and attitudes to-
ward credit information bureaus. 
Other potential determinants  
there have been a number of other 
firm-specific determinants of capital 
structure in the literature such as firm 
age, ownership, industry, firm size, 
tangible assets, audited financial state-
ment (Beck et al., 2005; le and nguy-
en, 2009; le, 2012). those variables 
which mainly related to demographics 
of owners or managers characteristics 
and firm characteristics will be used in 
this research as control variables. 
Based on the literature on SME financ-
ing from both the demand side and 
supply side, the study’s conceptual 
model is described in figure 2.
research Method 
Research Strategy 
Quantitative method with survey data 
and econometric analysis is mainly 
used in our study. for the purpose of 
survey design, at the first stage, we 
conducted interviews with five Viet-
namese small business owners. the 
purpose of these interviews was to 
help us to better apprehend the Viet-
nam Sme sector background as well 
as debt financing issues. This stage 
also supports us to investigate the face 
validity of the surveys and serve as a 
still include in the analysis as potential 
factors because of some reasons. first, 
because of the widely use of informal 
credit as a supplementary and/or sub-
stitutional credit source which was 
shown in surveys on Vietnam Smes 
(Ciem, 2012), we believe that it is a 
potential factor to explain the credit 
participation of Smes. Second, credit 
information bureaus today play an in-
creasingly important role in credit mar-
ket in developing countries (Jappelli 
and Pagano, 2002). a credit bureau’s 
main activity is to collect data from 
a variety of sources on enterprises or 
individuals, process and consolidate 
data into credit profiles, and dissemi-
nate credit information reports to lend-
ing grantors and supervisory authori-
ties. Credit information bureaus are 
intermediary institutions that help to 
enhance the transparency of the credit 
market and create special collateral 
called “reputation collateral,” which 
is particularly important to consumer, 
microfinance and small business lend-
ing (Luoto et al., 2007). However, the 
roles of credit bureau follow from the 
assumption that borrowers know that 
a credit information bureau records 
their borrowing and payment activi-
ties. additionally, borrowers have 
rights and are advised to request credit 
bureaus to check credit information 
about themselves regularly to assure 
there is no error in their credit records. 
therefore, if borrowers do not recog-
nize the existence of the credit infor-
mation bureau, its role as a discipline 
device will not work and will weaken 
other functions of credit bureaus in 
the credit market. moreover, the una-
wareness may hinder borrowers from 
accessing formal credit sources. to 
the best of our knowledge, there is no 
study considering the role of borrower 
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Small and medium Sized enterprises 
in the South of Vietnam, we use sim-
ple random sampling method to select 
1,500 firms to deliver the survey. The 
target respondents are owners or key 
managers of the companies. With the 
support of Small and medium Busi-
ness Association of HCMC, on one 
hand, we sent the survey through post-
mail; on the other hand, we apply per-
sonal approach to obtain high response 
rate. out of 1,500 surveys distributed, 
293 questionnaires are collected. after 
discarding inappropriate and missing 
value, 263 completed questionnaires 
are used to analyze. 
Questionnaire instrumentation
after conducting a quantitative pilot 
study for checking the instrument va-
lidity, some minor editorial adaptation 
was done to fit the context. The final 
instrument for the demand side con-
sisted of three main sections. Section 1 
refers to question 1 to 17, asking about 
demographic background of firms and 
owners such as firm size, firm age, lo-
cation, firm ownership type, export ac-
tivities involvement, auditing practice, 
industry, fixed asset ratio, the owner’s 
gender, age, education and experience 
years in the field. Section 2 includes 
11 questions, which are sets of experi-
foundation for the subsequent survey 
design. regarding the respondent se-
lection, we decided to choose Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCMC) to conduct the sur-
vey. the survey was carried out dur-
ing June–august 2013. urban-based 
Smes are selected mainly because 
they are located in the most dynamic 
cities where formal and informal fi-
nancial institutions gather with high 
density level; therefore, they have a 
variety of ways to choose the source 
for financing their operations. HCMC 
is always the leading city in terms of 
the number of business start-ups. in 
Southeast region particularly, there 
were 39.08% of the total of enterpris-
es located (Ciem 2012). moreover, 
HCMC, the “economic capital” and 
the biggest finance centre in Viet Nam, 
is the highest populous city where not 
only informal and formal firms but 
also informal and formal household 
businesses and traders converge on. 
Banking system revenue of the city 
accounts for approximately one-third 
of the total national banking system’s 
revenue. there are over 50 banks with 
hundreds of branches and lots of insur-
ance, leasing and financial companies 
in this city.
after obtaining a list of registered 
Smes from the assistance Center for 
figure 2. Conceptual model of the Study
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sample size than the one of multinom-
inal model (menard, 2001). thus, in 
our study, multiple binary logistic re-
gression is preferred instead of a sin-
gle multinominal logistic model. 
The Econometric Model 
explanatory variables computed from 
the survey are primarily in the categor-
ical form, particularly the information 
relating to Sme credit behaviors, thus 
logistic regression is appropriate to do 
quantitative analysis in our study. fur-
thermore, since dependent variables 
have dichotomous values, binary lo-
gistic regression is used. the model is 
expressed as:
 1)
Where:
zi=β0+β1x1+β2x2+...+βkxk 2)
in which:
pi is the probability that a considered 
event occurs
x1:xk are the observation of the k
th inde-
pendent variable 
β0 : βk are the regression coefficients 
that will be estimated
Measures of variables
to examine determinants of Smes 
credit participation, the two following 
dependent variables are defined: 
CreditPart: Participation of Smes 
in a credit program, regardless of in-
formal or formal credit source. this is 
a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value 1 if the Sme use debt in their 
capital structure or have access to 
credit and 0 otherwise
mental choice questions to identify be-
havior finance traits of the firm own-
ers. Section 3 comprises one question, 
asking about the firm networks. This 
section is structured using the five-
point Likert scale, ranging from “very 
little” (1) to “very extensive” (5) (see 
appendix B)
Analytical methods
a number of methods were used to 
analyze the collected data. descrip-
tion methods, crosstabulations and 
association tests were applied to ana-
lyze the survey data. in addition, we 
use the multiple binary logistic regres-
sion with two steps: In the first step, 
the data was divided into two groups: 
firms that borrowed from either formal 
credit institutions or informal credit 
channels or both and those that com-
pletely did not use debt in their capital 
structure. then stepwise binary logis-
tic regression was used to investigate 
if the potential determinants affect the 
probability of participating in a cer-
tain credit source. in step 2, we select-
ed enterprises that have debt in their 
capital structure, we then examined if 
the variables of interest affect credit 
source selection among Smes to inter-
pret motivations of Smes when they 
choose bank loan or informal loans as 
the main financing source. 
Some empirical studies suggested that 
binary logit model was superior to 
multinominal logit model in predicting 
the probability of a considered event. 
Binary logistic regression model has 
some advantages over multinominal 
one: first, smaller misclassification er-
rors helps to improve the accuracy of 
forecasting (Bi-Huei, 2012); second, 
binary logistic model helps to detect 
outliners easily and require the smaller 
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debt, credit card usage, microfinance) 
and attitude toward risk, we designed 
a set of six hypothetical questions 
to quantify risk aversion (daly et al. 
2010, dohmen et al. 2009). the re-
sponses to this question set are then 
used to create a six point risk attitudes 
index for the Sme owners/managers 
deBtatti: is a ratio scale variable 
measuring the attitude toward debt 
of the Sme owners/managers. Con-
struction of debt attitude scale ques-
tions was adapted from the studies by 
davies and lea (1995). in our study, 
debt attitude was estimated through 
a series of five Likert-scale questions 
regarding two facets: general percep-
tion of debt aversion and benefit/cost 
tradeoff of debt financing (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .82). Principle component 
analysis was used to calculate the debt 
attitude index. factor score was used 
as a non-standardized index (nSi) to 
measure overall attitude to credit in-
formation sharing activities. the value 
of the index can be positive or nega-
tive and therefore, making it difficult 
to explain. thus, a standard index (Si) 
was developed by min-max method:
 3)
oVerConfi: there is no consistency 
in measure managerial overconfidence 
in previous empirical studies. Park 
and Kim (2009) used the average of 
twelve months Business Survey index 
as proxy measure of overconfidence. 
oliver (2005) utilized Consumer Sen-
timent index by university of michi-
gan to measure overconfidence of the 
U.S. firm managers. In this study, we 
followed na dai and ivanow (2010) to 
measure overconfidence in financing 
CreSourCe: a binary variable that 
takes the value 1 if the Sme choose 
formal credit source (bank loans) as 
their main financing source and 0 oth-
erwise. 
explaining variables include the vari-
ables measuring behavioral finance 
factors, the variables represent social 
capital factors and control variables. 
PreSentBiaS: it is a categori-
cal variable measuring the present 
biased preference of respondents. 
this variable is measured through a 
set of experimental choice questions 
modified from the study of Bauer et 
al. (2012). respondents were asked 
to select between receiving either 
a smaller amount earlier in time or 
larger amounts with three months de-
lay. We proposed two set of questions 
with each set included five questions 
that each increased the future amount 
while keeping the instant amount un-
changed. The first set was offered at 
a present time frame and the second 
set was aimed at a future time frame. 
Based on the selection of respondents, 
we divided the population of respond-
ents into four groups: time consistency 
(current and future discount rate are 
equal), weakly present biased (Slightly 
more patient over future tradeoffs than 
current tradeoffs), strongly present bi-
ased (Strongly more patient over fu-
ture tradeoffs than current tradeoffs), 
and patient now-impatient later (less 
patient over future tradeoffs than cur-
rent tradeoffs) 
riSKatti: this is an ordinal variable 
measuring risk attitude or risk aversion 
of Sme owners/managers. follow-
ing previous empirical studies on the 
relationship between debt (household 
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to create a composite measure of the 
networks of SMEs with officials, busi-
ness communities, formal credit gran-
tors and informal credit grantors.
CiCaWare: General perceptions of 
respondents about credit information 
bureau, specifically the role and func-
tions of Vietnam credit information 
center. the true/false questions used 
to estimate the perception of Smes 
are modified from Dunkelberg et al. 
(1998).
Ciattitude: five-point likert scale 
questions were newly developed to 
measure attitude of Smes toward gen-
eral credit information sharing activi-
ties (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). Similar 
to debt attitude calculation, explora-
decisions. they measured the over-
confidence as the difference between 
the feasible probability that the firm 
application for loans will be refused 
given the firm characteristics as well 
as credit conditions and the firm own-
ers/managers’ subjective evaluation of 
this likelihood. 
netWorK measurement: We fol-
lowed Peng and luo (2000) to meas-
ure firm networks. Networking factors 
are mainly measured through 5-point 
scale questions, of which six ques-
tions were adapted from Peng and luo 
(2000), three questions were applied 
from le and nguyen (2009) and three 
were newly designed (Cronbach’s al-
pha = .72). We also followed Peng and 
luo (2000) in using average method 
table 1. dependent and independent Variables
code description of variables  type of variables
dependent variables
CreditPart Credit participation of Smes 1-use debt, 
0-otherwise
CreSourCe Selection of the main credit source 1-formal credit source, 
0-otherwise
independent variables
PreSentBiaS Present biased preference of respondents Categorical variable
riSKatti risk attitude or risk aversion of respondents ordinal variable
deBtatti attitude toward debt of the Sme owners/managers ratio scale variable 
oVerConfi Overconfidence of SME owners/managers 1-Overconfidence, 
0-otherwise
netoffiCial Networking with officials ratio scale variable 
netBuSineSS networking with business community ratio scale variable 
netformal networking with formal credit sources ratio scale variable 
netinform networking with informal credit grantors ratio scale variable 
CiCaWare General perceptions of respondents about credit information bureau 1-aware, 0-otherwise
CiSatti attitude of Smes toward general credit information sharing activities ratio scale variable 
Gender Gender of respondents 1-male, 0-otherwise
eduCat education levels of respondents Categorical variable 
eXPeri experience of respondents ratio scale variable 
aGeoWner age of the respondents, measured in years ratio scale variable 
firmaGe Age of the firm, measured in number of years ratio scale variable 
audit Whether the firm has audited financial statements 1-has audited reports, 
0-otherwise
eXPort involving in export activities 1-export, 0-otherwise
firmSiZe Size of firm Categorical variable
fiXaSSet Fixed Asset Ratio of the firm ordinal variable
INDUSTRY Industry the firm operating in Categorical variable
OWNSHIP Ownership of the firm Categorical variable
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uses debt in their capital structure, 
(comprising any type of borrowing, 
regardless of whether the debt come 
from formal or informal sources) and 
0 otherwise. 
from the estimation results, present 
biased preference, risk aversion, debt 
attitude, overconfidence, network with 
formal lenders, network with informal 
lenders, network with business com-
munities and attitude toward credit in-
formation sharing have impacts on the 
credit participation of surveyed Smes 
at a statistically significant level. More 
specifically, enterprises with impatient 
(weakly or strongly-present-biased) 
owners/managers are more likely to 
employ debt to run business rather than 
patient firm owners (other things being 
equal). of time preference types, the 
strongly-present-biased group show a 
significantly different need of borrow-
ing from “time-consistent” group. The 
respective probabilities of firms decid-
ing to use leverage are 6 and 73 times 
higher than that of “patient” firms.  
tory factor analysis was used to com-
pute factor scores on these items and 
create and standardize one variable by 
Min-Max Method that reflected credit 
information sharing attitude. 
the summarized descriptions of de-
pendent and independent variables are 
given in the table 1.
resuLt and discussion 
Model for Credit Participation
in the step 1, we used forward stepwise 
logistic regression to explore if the ex-
planatory variables affect the probabil-
ity of Smes credit participation. the 
independent variables included in the 
model comprise those were shown to 
have associations with the credit par-
ticipation according to parametric and/
or non-parametric tests results. table 
2 summarizes the logistic regression 
results at the last step.
in the model for credit participation, 
the dependent variable is dichoto-
mous, taking the value of 1 if the firm 
table 2. Credit Participation and explanatory Variables
 B S.e. Wald df Sig. exp(B)
PresentBiasedb   12.073 3 0.007  
PresentBiased(1) 1.821 0.704 6.684 1 0.010 6.176
PresentBiased(2) 4.291 1.380 9.661 1 0.002 73.014
PresentBiased(3) 1.140 0.737 2.395 1 0.122 3.128
riskattitude -0.526 0.251 4.375 1 0.036 0.591
daindex 0.094 0.019 24.562 1 0.000 1.098
network_formlend 1.482 0.407 13.275 1 0.000 4.401
network_inform -1.316 0.594 4.902 1 0.027 0.268
network_business 1.887 0.637 8.779 1 0.003 6.602
CiSattitude 0.056 0.018 9.313 1 0.002 1.058
overConf 2.072 0.772 7.202 1 0.007 7.944
Constant -13.180 2.827 21.73 1 0.000 0.000
observations 263
 -2 log likelihood 95.838
r-Squaredc 0.586 (Cox & Snell) 0.803 (Nagelkerke)
note:
a. Variables tested to enter: PreSentBiaS, riSKatti, deBtatti, oVerConfi, netoffiCial, 
netBuSineSS, netformal, netinform, CiCaWare, CiSatti, audit
b. Categorical Variable Codings: reference Category - time consistency; Present biased (1) - Weakly present 
biased; Present biased (2) - Strongly present-biased; Present biased (3) - Patient now, impatient later
c. R-square estimated at Step 8 (the final step)
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ticipating in the credit market are 7 
and 8 times higher than that of en-
terprise with looser degree of similar 
networks. interestingly, the negative 
estimated coefficients for network 
with informal lenders suggest that 
firms are less likely to employ debt if 
they have more intense relationship 
with informal lenders (which include 
moneylenders, friends and relatives, 
members at social clubs). this could 
be explained by the argument that in-
tense networks with potential informal 
lenders could motivate firms be out of 
formal credit market and make use of 
their relationships to have non-interest 
debt from relatives and friends. 
Last, estimated coefficient of CISATTI 
show that attitude toward credit infor-
mation sharing activities has a small 
impact on the decision of credit partic-
ipation. firms with higher positive at-
titude are more likely to participate in 
the credit market than firms with lower 
attitude, with the probability higher by 
only 1.07 times per additional unit of 
attitude score. the result also show 
that network with officials, audited 
financial reports, CIC Awareness and 
other control variables are insignifi-
cant determinants of Smes credit par-
ticipation.
Model for Credit Source Selection
in step 2, we selected only enterprises 
that had debt in their capital structure. 
We then performed binary logistic 
regression with forward stepwise se-
lection of variables to investigate the 
impact of potential factors on cred-
it source selection decision among 
Smes. the table 3 reports the result of 
the regression analysis with depend-
ent variable selection of credit source 
at the last step. the variable takes the 
With respect to risk aversion, for each 
unit increase in “risk aversion”, firms 
were 46% less likely to employ debt in 
their capital structure. it could be said 
that higher risk-tolerant firms (also 
meaning lower risk aversion) are often 
motivated to involve in risky invest-
ment or business expanding opportu-
nities and therefore, they have higher 
need of borrowing. 
in the case of debt attitude index, the 
estimated results indicate that firms 
with positive attitude toward debt are 
more likely to participate in the credit 
market with the probability larger by 
1.16 times per additional unit of debt 
attitude index. from the cross-section-
al analysis, the proportion of enter-
prises using leverage has higher score 
of debt attitude than that of non-debt 
using enterprises. 
The positively estimated coefficient 
for overconfidence factor depict that 
overconfident respondents are more 
likely to use debt in the capital struc-
ture. in other words, the likelihood of a 
company with an overconfident own-
er/manager is 25 times higher than that 
of a company with a non-confident 
owner/manager. 
regarding social capital factors or in 
this case, firm networks, estimation 
results show that efforts to build and 
maintain good relationships or net-
working with business communities 
(sellers, buyers, competitors, business 
association members) and formal lend-
ers motivate and help firms to access 
credit, no matter what source of credit 
comes from. the respective probabili-
ties of enterprises with highly intense 
degree of networking with business 
communities and formal lenders par-
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carry large debt from formal credit 
suppliers than the rest (if other factors 
are equal). instead, they have a ten-
dency to employ more debt from in-
formal sources. 
Strong evidence of the impact of risk 
aversion factor on credit source se-
lection was also found. at the 99% 
confidence interval, the higher risk 
aversion level the firms have, the 
more likely they are to go with formal 
credit source as their main financing 
source. For each unit increase in “risk 
aversion”, the probability of select-
ing formal credit sources is 2.5 times 
higher. the most likely explanation 
of this result is the difference in risk 
between credit formal and informal 
sources. informal credit sources have 
their own advantages such as flexible 
arrangements, not strict requirement 
of collaterals, low transaction costs 
but they are also expensive and un-
reliable sources. this contrasts with 
the formal lender providers, who offer 
value of 1 if the firm choose formal 
credit source such as bank loan as their 
main external financing source and 
0 otherwise. independent variables 
which showed a relationship with de-
pendent variables in association tests 
were included in the model.
the results indicate that Present biased 
preference, risk attitude, network with 
officials, network with formal lenders, 
network with informal lenders, and 
firm size are statistically significant 
determinants of the credit source se-
lection. 
among present-biased preference sub-
categories, only strongly-present bi-
ased group demonstrates the inverse 
relationship with credit source selec-
tion at the 5% level of significant. The 
value of exp(B) for strongly-present 
biased was .115 which implies a de-
crease in the odds of 88.5%. That is to 
say, strongly-present biased firm own-
ers/managers are 88.5% less likely to 
table 3. Credit Source Selection and explanatory Variables
 B S.e. Wald df Sig. exp(B)
PresentBiasedb   9.323 3 0.025  
PresentBiased(1) 0.169 0.693 0.059 1 0.807 1.184
PresentBiased(2) -2.161 0.912 5.614 1 0.018 0.115
PresentBiased(3) 0.267 0.879 0.092 1 0.761 1.306
riskattitude 0.924 0.266 12.088 1 0.001 2.520
Network_Officials 1.184 0.481 6.069 1 0.014 3.269
network_formlend 1.234 0.442 7.803 1 0.005 3.434
network_inform -4.012 0.766 27.415 1 0.002 0.018
firmSizec   10.155 2 0.006  
firmSize(1) 2.367 0.763 9.637 1 0.002 10.667
firmSize(2) 2.365 0.909 6.768 1 0.009 10.643
Constant 1.86 1.841 1.020 1 0.312 6.422
observations 180
 -2 log likelihood 97.089
r-Squaredd 0.5635 (Cox & Snell) 0.7559 (nagelkerke)
note:
a. Variable(s) tested to enter: GENDER, AGEOWNER, FIRMAGE, INDUSTRY, FIRMSIZE, EXPORT, AUDIT, 
PreSentBiaS, riSKatti, oVerConfi, netoffiCial, netformal, netinform, CiCaWare
b. Categorical Variable Codings: reference Category - time consistency; Present biased (1) - Weakly present 
biased; Present biased (2) - Strongly present-biased; Present biased (3) - Patient now, impatient later.
c. Categorical Variable Codings: reference Category – micro enterprises; firmsize (1) – Small enterprises; 
firmsize (2) – medium enterprises
d. R-square estimated at Step 6 (the final step)
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lect formal credit sources compared to 
micro-size enterprises.
the regression analysis also show that 
at the 5% significant level, independent 
variables such as owner Gender, age, 
firm age, industry, export, audited 
Financial reports, overconfidence and 
CiC awareness did not play a role in 
predicting the credit source selection. 
the reason may be due to the correla-
tion among independent variables and 
numeric problems when estimating the 
model.    
Discussion
our results generally support the hy-
pothesis that firms financing decisions 
are significantly affected by behavior 
finance factors and firm social capital. 
We found that personal traits of firms 
owners/managers such as present-
biased preference, debt attitude, risk 
aversion and overconfidence could 
play important roles in explaining the 
decision of debt using as well as credit 
source selection for small enterprises. 
in addition, the results also suggested 
that social capital, which was repre-
sented and measured through firms 
networking, have effects on Smes 
credit participation and credit source 
selection. Besides, firm attitude toward 
credit information sharing, a factor 
more or less reflect the firm creditwor-
thiness and efforts to be transparent in 
the eyes of credit grantors, and firm 
size also contributed in explaining the 
SMEs financing decisions.
there are several imperative contribu-
tions which our research made to the 
literature of business management. at 
the first place, the research is one of 
the few studies that consider the influ-
ence of behavioral finance factors on 
relatively low interest rates, but often 
enforce complicated and time-con-
suming procedures on borrowers that 
boost their transaction costs. informal 
credit sources are believed that their 
inherent risks are always higher than 
that of formal credit sources like bank 
loans. Borrowing from informal credit 
sources, especially from moneylend-
ers is able to increase the risk of bank-
ruptcy for enterprises. therefore, it is 
reasonable that if an entrepreneur has 
a high tolerant level of risk he/she is 
more willing to choose informal credit 
to finance their business.    
With regards to firm networking, es-
timation results illustrate that intense 
networks with officials and formal 
lenders could enhance the probability 
of formal credit access; consequently, 
firms with high score of such networks 
have trends to go with formal credit 
source as their important financing 
source. in detail, for each unit increase 
in network score with officials and 
formal lenders, survey Smes were ap-
proximately 3.2 and 3.4 times more 
likely to select formal credit source, 
respectively. on the contrary, for each 
unit increase in “network with infor-
mal lenders”, respondents were about 
98% less likely to go with formal cred-
it source. to put it another way, highly 
intense network with informal credit 
providers increase the probability of 
firms to select informal sources. 
Finally, positive coefficients of firm 
size sub-categories show that the firm 
size factor play a role in explaining 
the firm credit source selection. Spe-
cifically, the firms that belongs to the 
small-size group and medium-size 
group were approximately 2.4 and 1.8 
times respectively more likely to se-
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an information-based one. in the con-
text of lending transactions conducted 
based on relationship and/or collateral, 
small businesses and individuals may 
not pay a serious attention to credit 
information bureau and may not try 
the best to keep good records on their 
credit history profile. In addition, the 
database of Vietnam credit informa-
tion center is still limited with credit 
information data collected from fi-
nancial institutions in the market. as 
a consequent, Vietnam CiC does not 
have sufficient information to give 
a well-founded estimation about po-
tential borrowers’ creditworthiness. it 
also means that the only public cred-
it bureau in Vietnam is not powerful 
enough to make borrowers cautious 
in their payment practices as well as 
help credit institutions to make precise 
lending decisions based on CiC credit 
reports. 
Managerial Implications
our data suggest that social capital 
is critical to Smes credit participa-
tion and credit source selection. once 
market institutions and infrastructures 
in developing country like Vietnam is 
incomplete with high level of informa-
tion asymmetry problems, social and 
business networks will play important 
roles in helping Smes to ease busi-
ness procedures and transactions, bor-
rowing included. this suggests that it 
is necessary to provide education and 
training programs for Smes owners 
to develop their networks effectively, 
in addition to conventional practices 
such as well-prepared business plans 
and financial statements, audit execu-
tion and reporting. moreover, bank 
loan officers should be prepared to 
work with private businesses under 
uncertainty and trained to collect and 
firms financing decision. Especially, 
from the perspective of behavioral 
finance and social capital, our study 
helps to investigate the latent motiva-
tions to explain the reason why there is 
a significant proportion of firms with 
completely non-debt using and why 
informal loans still play important 
role in the financing of SMEs. Second, 
while the role of social capital is men-
tioned as an important determinant 
in enhancing firm performance and 
finance accessibility worldwide, the 
study highlight its role in construct-
ing legitimacy for small enterprises 
in developing markets. in Vietnam, 
informal data seems to be the basis 
of the bank loan officers’ estimation 
of enterprise creditworthiness. Public 
information, if it is available, helps to 
provide supplementary data that can 
support the application packages le-
gally acceptable (nguyen, 2005). the 
study proved the importance of infor-
mal networks, which is consistent with 
this argument. our study indicated that 
network with informal/ formal lenders 
even affect the Smes decision of cred-
it source selection. 
Though we did not find strong evi-
dences of the role of awareness and 
attitude toward credit information 
sharing practices on SMEs financ-
ing decisions, it is undeniable about 
the role of credit information bureaus 
in enhancing credit accessibility for 
firms, which have been confirmed by 
many empirical studies. the role of 
credit information bureaus and “repu-
tation collateral” is only promoted in 
an information-based lending sys-
tem. Yet, there is still a long way for 
a transition market like Vietnam to 
transform from a collateral-based and 
relationship-based lending system to 
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policies and practices from informal 
credit providers. Micro-finance studies 
indicated that group lending services 
or lending forms of rotating savings 
and credit association attract individu-
als with present-biased preference. 
formal credit institutions could learn 
and create more creative credit line 
products like that case of informal fi-
nance. 
concLusion
the large proportion of Smes badly 
needs external financial resources for 
growth but there are still many enter-
prises who “avoid” debt in their capi-
tal structure. this study is an attempt 
to investigate the motivation behind 
the decision to participate in the credit 
market of Smes from perspectives of 
behavioral finance and social capital 
theory. furthermore, we found that 
personal traits of Smes owners/man-
agers in terms of behavioral finance 
factors and firms networking also have 
impacts on the firms’ credit source 
selection. our results contribute to 
explain the common use of informal 
credit market in developing countries.
verify valuable information through 
formal and informal networks. 
Besides, building network with credit 
information bureau through keeping 
good credit records, updating credit 
reports with the bureau annually is 
also important for enterprises to ac-
cess formal credit sources easily. the 
system cannot be fully work-out, non-
performing loans cannot be reduced if 
borrowers do not pay attention to the 
existence and role of credit informa-
tion system. Credit information bu-
reaus and credit institutions should 
coordinate to diffuse knowledge about 
the role of credit information practices 
to borrowers and potential customers. 
This can be done by carrying out finan-
cial education for customers through 
media channels or directly improving 
customers’ awareness when they come 
to banks.
The finding on the impact of behav-
ioral finance factors has implications 
for banks to consider creating lending 
products which is suitable for personal 
traits of Smes owners. formal credit 
institutions can learn about lending 
References
atieno, r. (2009), linkages, access to finance and the Performance of Small-
scale enterprises in Kenya.  Journal of Accounting and Business Research, 
3(1), 33-48.
Baker, M., Ruback, R. & Wurgler, J. (2005), Behavioral Corporate Finance: A 
survey. Working paper.
Bauer, M., Chytilova, J. & Morduch, J. (2012), Behavioral Foundations of Micro-
credit: experimental and Survey evidence from rural india. American Eco-
nomic Review, 102(2), 1118-1139.
Beck, B., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L. & Levine, R. (2005). Finance, Firm Size 
and Growth. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3485.
Credit Participation and Credit Source Selection... Nguyen and Otake
121
Biggs, T., & Shah, M. African SMEs, (2006), Networks, and Manufacturing Per-
formance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, pp. 3043–3066.
Bi-Huei, T. (2012), Comparison of Binary Logit Model and Multinomial Logit 
model in Predicting Corporate failure. Review of Economics and Finance, 2 
(11), 99-111.
Boot, W.a. (2000), relationship Banking: What do We Know? Journal of Finan-
cial Intermediation, 9(1), pp. 7-25. 
Brown, S., Garino, G. & Taylor, K. (2013), Household Debt and Attitudes towards 
risk. Review of Income and Wealth, 59(2), 283-304.
Ciem [Central institute for economic management] (2012), Characteristics of 
the Vietnamese Business Environment: Evidence from a SME Survey in 2011. 
Report. November. Hanoi: Central Institute for Economic Management
Cressy, r. (1995), Business Borrowing and Control: a theory of entrepreneurial 
types. Small Business Economics, 7(3), pp. 291–300.
Daly, M., Delaney, L. & McManus, S. (2010), Risk Attitudes as an Independ-
ent Predictor of debt. University College Dublin. Geary Institute, available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ucd/wpaper/201049.html
Davies, E. & Lea, S.E.G. (1995), Student Attitudes to Student Debt. Journal of 
Economic Psychology 16(4), pp. 663-679
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J. & Wagner, G.G. (2011), 
individual risk attitudes: measurement, determinants, and Behavioral Con-
sequences. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(3), pp. 522-550.
Duy, V. Q., D’Haese, M., Lemba, J., Hau, L. L., & D’Haese, L. (2012), Deter-
minants of household access to formal credit in the rural areas of the mekong 
delta, Vietnam. African and Asian Studies, 11(3), 261-287.
fairchild, r. (2005), Behavioral finance in a Principal-agent model of Capital 
Budgeting. Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2(1), 34-44.
Grable, J. E. & Lytton, R. H. (2003), The Development of a Risk Assessment In-
strument: a follow-up Study. Financial Services Review, 12, 257–274.
Hackbarth, D. (2008), Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(4), pp. 843-881.
THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT © October 2014 • VOL.8 • NO.2
122
Hussain, J., Millman, C. & Matlay, H. (2006), SME financing in the UK and in 
China: a comparative perspective. Journal Small Business and Enterprise De-
velopment, 13(4), 584–599.
Ikeda, S. & Myong-Il Kang. (2011), Generalized Hyperbolic Discounting, Bor-
rowing Aversion and Debt Holding. ISER Discussion Paper 0817, institute of 
Social and economic research, osaka university.
Jappelli, T. & Pagano, M. (2002), Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: 
Cross-Country evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(10), pp. 2017-
2045.
Khwaja A., Mian A. & Qamar A. (2011), Bank Credit and Business Networks. 
Working Paper Series. Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment.
Kinari, Y., Ohtake, F. & Tsutsui, Y. (2009), Time Discounting: Declining Impa-
tience and interval effect. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 39(1), pp. 87-112
Laibson, D., Reppeto, A. & Tobacman, J. (2007), Estimating discount functions 
with consumption choices over lifecycle. NBER Working Paper Series 13314.
Le, Ngoc T.B. & Nguyen Thang, V. (2009), The Impact of Networking on Bank 
financing: the Case of Small and medium-Sized enterprises in Vietnam. En-
trepreneurship Theory and Practice 33(4), 867-887.
le, Phuong nu minh. (2012), What determines the access to Credit by Smes? a 
Case Study in Vietnam. Journal of Management Research, 4(4), 90-115.
Lea, S.E.G., Webley, P. & Walker, C.M. (1995), Psychological Factors in Cco-
nsumer debt: money management, economic Socialization and Credit use. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 16(4), pp. 681-701.
Livingston, S.M. & Lunt, P.K. (1992), Predicting Personal Debt and Debt Repay-
ment: Psychological, Social and economic determinants. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 13(1), pp. 111-134.
Luoto ,J., McIntosh, C. & Wydick, B. (2007), Credit Information Systems in Less 
Developed Countries: A Test with Microfinance in Guatemala. Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change, 55(2), pp. 313-334.
McGrath, R.G. & MacMillan, I.C. (1992), More Like Each Other Than Anyone 
else? a Cross-Cultural Study of entrepreneurial Perceptions. Journal of Busi-
ness Venturing, 7(5), pp. 419-429.
Credit Participation and Credit Source Selection... Nguyen and Otake
123
Meier, S. & Sprenger, C. (2007), Impatience and CreditB: Evidence from a Field 
experiment. FRB of Boston Working Paper no. 07-3.
menard, S. (2001). Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (Quantitative Applica-
tions in the Social Sciences). SaGe Publications, inc; 2nd edition.
Moro, A. & Fink, M. (2013), Loan Managers’ trust and Credit Access for SMEs. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 927-936.
Na Dai & Vladimir, I. (2010), Entrepreneurial Optimism, Credit Availability, and 
Cost of financing: evidence from uS Small Businesses. SSRN eLibrary.
Nguyen, T.D.K. & N. Ramachandran (2006), Capital Structure in Small and 
medium-sized enterprises: the Case of Vietnam. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 
23(2), 192-211.
Nguyen, V.T., Le, T.B.N., & Freeman, N. (2006), Trust and Uncertainty: A Study 
of Bank lending to Private Smes in Vietnam.  Asia Pacific Business Review, 
12(4), pp. 549-570.
O’Donoghue, T. & Rabin, M. (2000), The Economics of Immediate Gratification. 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(2), pp. 233–250.
Oliver, B.R. (2005), The Impact of Management Confidence on Capital Structure. 
Working Paper, available at SSrn: http://ssrn.com/abstract=791924
Park, C. & Kim, H. (2009), The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence on Lever-
age. International Business & Economics Research Journal, 8(12), pp. 115-
126.
Peng, M. & Luo, Y. (2000), Managerial Ties and Firm Performance in a Transi-
tion economy: the nature of a micro-macro link. Academy of Management 
Journal, 43(3), pp. 486–501.
Ravina, E. (2012), Love & Loans: The Effect of Beauty and Personal Characteris-
tics in Credit markets. Working paper, New York University.
Rice, T. & Strahan, P.E. (2010), Does Credit Competition Affect Small-Firm Fi-
nance? The Journal of Finance, 65(3), pp. 861–889.
Sogorb-Mira, F. (2005), How SME Uniqueness Affects Capital Structure: Evi-
dence from a 1994–1998 Spanish Data Panel. Small Business Economics, 
25(5), pp. 447–457.
THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT © October 2014 • VOL.8 • NO.2
124
Talavera, O., Lin Xiong & Xiong Xiong. (2012), Social Capital and Access to 
Bank financing: the Case of Chinese entrepreneurs. Emerging Markets Fi-
nance and Trade, 48(1), 55-69.
Turvey, C. G., & Kong, R. (2010), Informal Lending Amongst Friends and Rela-
tives: Can microcredit Compete in rural China?. China Economic Review, 
21(4), 544-556.
Yu, M., Xia, X. & Zou, Z. (2006), The Relationship between Manager’s Over-
confidence and Enterprises’ Radical Behavior in Incurring Debts. Managing 
World, 8, 104-125.
Zhang, Q. & Fung, H.G. (2006), China’s Social Capital and Financial Perfor-
mance of Private enterprises. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Devel-
opment, 13(2), 198-207.
research Questionnaire for sMe owners/managers
section a: 
1. Position: �a. Owner �b. Manager �c. Other
2. sex:  �a. Male �b. Female   
3. age: ……….
4. the entrepreneur’s name:   ………………………………………….
5. the year of establishment: …………………………………………...
6. ownership: 
�a Household Business �e Joint-stock company with partly state ownership
�b Private enterprise  �f Joint-stock company with no state ownership 
�c Cooperative �g Joint-venture company with foreign capital 
�d limited liability company �h State-owned enterprise
7. industry/Business Field:
�a. Industrials & Construction (Industrials, Basic materials, construction, Real 
estate)
�b. Consumer Goods (Food &Beverage, Personal & Household Goods)
�c. Consumer Services (Retail, Healthcare included)
�d. Telecommunication & Technology
8. the number of experience years you have been working in this industry/
field (even before establishing this entrepreneur): ………….. years
9. educational level: 
�a. Primary/Secondary  �c. College/University
�b. High school  �d. Master or higher
10. owner’s average income per month:
�a. < 20 million VND �c. 51-100m VND �e.> 151m VND
�b.21-50m VND �d.101- 150m VND
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11. does the entrepreneur participate in export activities?  �Yes  �No
12. total assets of your business:
�a.<1billion Vnd �b.1-10b Vnd �c.11-50b Vnd �d.50-100b Vnd
13. Fixed assets as a percentage of total assets in your business:
�a.0%-10% �b.11%-30% �c.31%-50% �d.51-70%
14. Bank loans as a percentage of total assets in your business:
�a. No bank loan     �b. <10%     �c.11%-30%     �d.31%-50%     �e.>50%
15. informal loans (borrowing from relatives, friends, moneylenders) as a per-
centage of total assets:
�a. No informal loans     �b.<10%     �c.11%-30%     �d.31%-50%     �e.>50%
16. In the past two years, has your firm ever been turn downed by banks?
�a. No borrowing from banks
�b. Banks accepted short-term (or long-term) loans but declined long-term loans 
(or short-term)
�c. Banks declined both short-term and long-term loans
�d. Banks always accepted
17. (For firms which use debt in capital structure) In your opinion, which 
credit source is more important to your business?
�a. Formal credit sources such as banks 
�b. Informal credit sources such as relatives, friends, partners, moneylenders
section B: 
Q1. Given your present circumstances, suppose you won a tax-free prize at a lo-
cal bank and were offered a choice  between two prizes. Please choose one 
among each pair of prizes as follows:
option a
Getting money today or
option B
Getting money three months later
(1) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(2) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(3) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(4) �A. Getting 1000$ today
(5) �A. Getting 1000$ today
or 
or 
or 
or 
or
�B. Getting 1050$ three months later
�B. Getting 1100$ three months later
�B. Getting 1200$ three months later
�B. Getting 1300$ three months later
�B. Getting 1400$ three months later
Q2. By the same token, among each pair choices of prize, please choose one you 
prefer.
option a
Getting money a year later or
option B
Getting money a year and three months later
(1) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(2) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(3) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(4) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
(5) �A. Getting 1000$ a year later
or 
or 
or 
or 
or
�B. Getting 1050$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1100$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1200$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1300$ a year and three months later
�B. Getting 1400$ a year and three months later
Q3. Suppose your business had been running very well and have an ability to 
guarantee your income for your family. and this current business was your/
your family’s only source of income. then you are given the opportunity to 
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take a new and quite good investment with 50-50 chance that it will double 
your income. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your income and 
spending power by a third. Would you accept this new investment?     
 �Yes     �no
For those who answer “yes” for Q3, please answer Q4; “no” for Q3, please 
answer Q5
Q.4 now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would double 
your income, and 50-50 chance that it would cut it in half. Would you accept? 
�Yes     �no
if you answer “yes” to Q4, please answer Q7, “no” for Q4, please answer Q8
Q.5 now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would double 
your income (profit), and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20%. Then would you 
accept?     �Yes     �no
for those who answer “yes” to Q5, please answer Q8; “no” to Q5, please an-
swer Q6
Q.6 now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would 
double your profit and 50-50 that it could it by 10%. Then would you accept? 
�Yes     �no
Q.7 now, suppose that the chances were 50-50 that the new investment would 
double your income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 75%. Would you still 
accept?     �Yes     �no
Q8. Please indicate by ticking in the appropriate box to what extent you agree/
disagree to the statement about borrowing:
(1)Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not sure; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly Agree
1. Debt is an integral part of doing business because it help firm to 
extend investment chances and have tax shield. 1 2 3 4 5
2. the entrepreneur should be discouraged from using debts since 
interest expense can become a burden causing bankruptcy and the 
control of the firm will be lost.
1 2 3 4 5
3. the entrepreneur should satisfy with your current situation rather 
than borrow money to expand your business. 1 2 3 4 5
4. it is oK to have a loan if you know you can pay if off. 1 2 3 4 5
5. Once you are in debt it is very difficult to get out. 1 2 3 4 5
6. owing money is basically wrong. 1 2 3 4 5
Q9. during the last three years, were there times when you needed credit for your 
business, but did not apply because you thought the application would be 
turned down?     �Yes     �no
Q10. Please indicate by ticking in the box whether statements about vietnam 
credit information center (CIC) is right or Wrong:
right wrong
1. CiC is a government agency that collects and maintains credit 
records of firms and individuals.
� �
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2. CIC is a private corporation that collects unpaid bills of firms 
and consumers. � �
3. The main role of CIC is to rate firms and consumers and 
determine whether or not they can receive credit � �
4. Credit history report issued by CiC could affect the accessibility 
to credit of the entrepreneur � �
Q11. Please indicate by ticking in the appropriate box to what extent you agree/
disagree to the statement about CiC:
(1)Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not sure; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly Agree
1. the lender to whom i apply for loan can check my previous 
borrowing information at other financial institutions, especially 
regarding collateral and late or non-repayment activities
1 2 3 4 5
2. late repayment or default in the past does not affect the decision of 
the lender to whom i apply for a loan. 1 2 3 4 5
3. i have always been trying to keep my credit record good to get loans 
easily by repaying principle and interest amounts of my personal 
and firm’s loans on time.
1 2 3 4 5
4. When I apply for credit, I am willing to let the loan officer check the 
information about me and the firm on file with CIC Vietnam
1 2 3 4 5
5. The credit information about me and my firm provided by CIC 
makes the bank trust my creditworthiness 1 2 3 4 5
Q12. Please indicate by ticking in the appropriate box to describe the extent to 
which top managers at your firm have utilized personal ties, networks, and 
connections during the past three years with
(1)very little    (5)very extensive
 1. Network with Top managers at buyer firms 1 2 3 4 5
 2. Network with Top managers at supplier firms 1 2 3 4 5
 3. Network with Top managers at competitor firms 1 2 3 4 5
 4. network with Political leaders in various levels of the government 1 2 3 4 5
 5. Network with Officials in industrial bureaus 1 2 3 4 5
 6. Network with Officials in regulatory and supporting organizations 
such as tax bureaus, the state bank, commercial administration 
bureaus, etc.
1 2 3 4 5
 7. network with members of business associations 1 2 3 4 5
 8. Network with Members of social clubs or associations 1 2 3 4 5
 9. network with relatives and friends who do not belong to any of 
above categories 1 2 3 4 5
 10. network with moneylenders (informal) 1 2 3 4 5
 11. Network with Loan officers at some commercial banks 1 2 3 4 5
 12. Network with Loan officers at People Credit Fund/ Microcredit 
financial institutions 1 2 3 4 5
